US digital diplomacy: The tools of 2010, the insight of 1910?

The US State Department's thinking on digital diplomacy still seems mired in a 'push' model of message projection. Instead of responding to the concerns publics around the world want to talk about, or engaging in a more dialogic model of conversation, the strategy is: get the message out. In last week's New York Times magazine two US State Dept. digital diplomacy advisers, Jared Cohen and Alec Ross, were given an extended chance to sell their latest strategies. It quickly became clear in the article that policymakers still assume that the US has a coherent message: itself, its values, its history. In the article, Hillary Clinton is quoted as saying, "Much of the world doesn't really know as much as you might think about American values." So, let's say there are such things as American values and that these can be pushed out to much of the world, how would this work in an age of social media? Here, Ross explains:

“You have a body of great material [promoting America]. We ought to have somebody go through it and do grabs. Figure out over the course of whatever it is you’ve said, those things that can be encapsulated in 140 characters or less. Let’s say it’s 10 things. We then translate it into Pashto, Dari, Urdu, Arabic, Swahili, etc., etc. The next thing is we identify the ‘influencer’ Muslims on Twitter, on Facebook, on the other major social-media platforms. And we, in a soft way, using the appropriate diplomacy, reach out to them and say: Hey, we want to get across the following messages. They’re messages that we think are consistent with your values. This is a voice coming from the United States that we think you wanted to hear. So we get the imam. . . .”

“. . . the youth leader. . . .” [Farah] Pandith [also US State Dept.] said.

“We get these other people to then play the role of tweeting it, and then saying, ‘Follow this woman,’ and/or putting it on whatever dominant social-media platform they use.”

The strategy of finding (or paying) credible intermediaries and creating a translation bureaucracy is not the same thing as allowing peer-to-peer public diplomacy to blossom. Most importantly, it does not equate to listening and taking into account the perspectives of others -- people around the world for whom 'American values' might seem threatening, hypocritical etc. Hence, the mission will preach to the converted.

The report does tell us about other strings to the digital diplomacy bow, such as encouraging cyberactivism in authoritarian countries. Nevertheless, it is astonishing that a push model of political communication is being written about in the New York Times as somehow novel; not just novel, but so exciting that eating must be put on hold, for, as the journalist reports, "Ross hadn't eaten anything besides a morning muffin ... dinner could wait."

7/7 Five Years On: Media Still Unclear How to Report Risk

On the fifth anniversary of the 7/7 bombings of 5 July 2005, Chatham House today held a conference to examine our security culture and the development of counter-terrorism in the years since 52 people were killed. The event also marked the publication of a special issue of International Affairs featuring articles reporting on the various aspects of our security culture – including an article by Andrew Hoskins and myself on media coverage of ‘radicalisation’ in which we argue, controversially, and based on a recent study of British Muslim audiences, that the BBC may have more of a radicalising effect than jihadist websites.

Central to today’s discussion was evaluating risk: what risk of terrorism is serious, and how much risk can we live with? With no repeats of 7/7, has British counter-terrorism policy been a success? To reach an answer, we’d need to know exactly the number of cases security agencies have followed and attacks they’ve thwarted. But such data is necessarily secret, and without it, citizens, many politicians, and journalists are all at sea. Take the front page of today’s The Times:

Security agencies are monitoring round the clock two active terrorist cells known to be planning attacks in Britain, The Times has learnt.

The cells stand out from dozens of police and security services operations because they have discussed methods of attack, including “soft targets” that could result in large-scale civilian casualties, according to security sources.

[…] Andy Hayman, the former assistant commissioner who led the 7/7 investigation … writes in The Times today that Britain is under its biggest ever threat from terror. He says: “There are now probably more radicalised Muslims, their attack plans are more adventurous and the UK still remains under severe risk.”

Biggest ever threat? More radicalised Muslims that ever? What are journalists to do, given that they don’t have access to the data and security agencies have manipulated threat perceptions in the past? The Times decided to publish what appears scaremongering. But what if Hayman is under-playing the number of cases? The point is we cannot know. Five years on from 7/7, security journalism is still not equipped to report with clarity, insight and proportionately on its subject matter.  

From the Long War and the War on Terror to the Long Change

‘We are not involved in the ‘long war’ or the ‘war on terror’ but the ‘long change’ and only soft power will bring that about’.

So reads the latest report [click here] from Wilton Park, the informal meeting place of invited foreign policy thinkers and practitioners in the English countryside, following a conference on ‘Public Diplomacy: Moving from Policy to Practice’ last month. Even if the phrase does not take hold, it indicates current thinking on how Britain and the US should engage with the world through public diplomacy.

To exercise soft power is to project the attractiveness of one’s own country in order to make other states and societies amenable to one’s political and economic interests. The Long Change will be a change of opinion towards the UK and US and social change in target countries who contain people who don't like us. This is primarily couched as a security issue – making individuals at home or abroad less likely to use terrorist violence against UK/US interests. But the Long Change is also about making foreign publics more disposed to UK/US policies around trade, development, and climate change.

What is new is that this public diplomacy can be done by publics themselves through social media. The clumsy strategic communication officers of the state can stand back. This approach assumes that communication and connection between people across borders through social media can have a liberal, pluralizing effect. But its not clear why people would engage in patient, deliberative, possibly multilingual conversation with people in other countries about controversial political issues. Anyone familiar with the ‘under the line’ discussions on news websites will see how quickly and often the conversation becomes a hostile dialogue of the deaf.

So, perversely, publics must be taught how to be spontaneously deliberative. Forums for ‘global conversations’ will be created, along the lines of the BBC’s Have Your Say online spaces. These will form the ideal of what public-to-public diplomacy is about, for emulation by progressive media around the world. Unacceptable opinions or styles of participation will be moderated out. The mechanism for the long change is us, or what has been called in recent years ‘the power of we’ and ‘we the media’. But any global ‘we’ will have to be carefully constructed and edited.

It is the harnessing of social media tools that mark the Long Change from the War on Terror and Long War. The War on Terror also targeted foreign publics as security threats, following the 9/11 attacks, but relied primarily on military tools to create the liberal countries which would thereafter pose not security risks. In 2006, Brid. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, the head of the US military’s Central Command (CENTCOM), set out his vision of the Long War. The objective of the Long War was to maintain US pre-eminence by organising a global network of forces to deter would-be threats and rivals.

This time, the US-led network would not be primarily military. It would be composed of whatever was felt necessary to win, prevent and defeat threats, through soft power ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns and economic incentives as well as special forces security operations.

However, if the criteria of success in the War on Terror and the Long War was ‘whose story wins’, in Jo Nye’s terms, then the US and UK stories were not winning. The narrative of benign liberal interventionism was contradicted by the realities of civilian deaths and political instability in Iraq and Afghanistan and images from Abu Ghraib prison, all of which reinforced long-held narratives of victimisation and injustice among Muslim publics around the world. The lessons learnt from the mid-2000s were that actions must match words and the story had to be told in new ways, hence Obama’s Cairo speech in 2009 (though not followed by actions) and the notion that ordinary people can tell the story, do the diplomacy.

The principle of the Long Change is cultivating long term relationships between publics and between foreign publics and your state. The notion of long term relationships reflects the influence of marketing and branding experts on current public diplomacy practices. I form a long term attachment to a brand of shaving cream or a band if I trust they will always deliver the experience I enjoy, so why couldn’t an attachment to the Cool Britannia and 'our boys' overseas be created?

In theory, all this would be cheap. Creating online forums, and even spreading technology so people can connect, is much less expensive than traditional military tools. In our financial climate, the Long Change would still need to demonstrate value for money. Hence, there would be a need to devise measures of the ‘impact’ of public-to-public communication on, say, political attitudes and behaviour among foreign publics. At this stage of the Long Change, it is not clear what such metrics would be. No doubt political scientists, sociologists, psychologists and media evaluation firms will be asked to partner-up.

We might also ask, who or what is expected to change. At first glance, it appears that foreign publics are the targets of persuasion, based on the assumption that ‘our’ ideas would naturally win in any rational deliberation and the soft power theory that the attractiveness of ‘our’ values will prevail. This is risky and perhaps arrogant. In public-to-public communication, whether spontaneous or staged, perhaps it will be people in the UK or US whose attitudes will change if they begin deliberating international affairs with people in Pakistan or Syria. Other countries and other political groups around the world have their own narratives about the future of the international order, their own readings of history, their own interests to promote. They, too, want to enact long changes. 

And how long is Long? The Long War was to be generational, a second Cold War to defeat a second evil ideology, that of Al-Qaeda. Yet the policies referred to in the War on Terror and Long War began before the 9/11 attacks and endure still, a set of approaches to counter-terrorism and issues like international development, immigration, finance and the regulation of information and communication technologies (ICTs) that became treated as matters of security rather than fields in their own right during the 1990s. To define an era in these broad terms may give focus to foreign policymakers but it is also to implicitly rationalize a set of policies as ‘fitting’ but whose appropriateness we may question.

The Long Change, should it come to pass, implicates social media - and us as users and citizens – directly into international affairs in ways that require very careful scrutiny. 

Reporting War: Exploring the Way Forward

Reporting War: Exploring the Way Forward

Media responsibilities in conflict situations

A Centre for Journalism and Communication Research Symposium

Bournemouth University

2 July 2010

Ben O'Loughlin has been invited to present to a workshop exploring how conflict reportage can be improved. Questions to be discussed include: 

What can the analysis of the reporting of past conflicts tell us about future ones?

What role should ‘peace journalism’ have in the future media landscape?

In what ways does the training of journalists need to change?

How are citizen journalists challenging traditional practices of war reporting?

What are the ethical issues posed by social media, such as Twitter?

How might media professionals and academics help government, military and NGO institutions redefine the priorities of war reporting?

Ben will examine how news media stage public opinion and 'global conversations' in the run up to, and aftermath, of conflict situations. War and conflict reporting is a field full of criticisms and laments about the nature and quality of coverage, so constructive discussion about how to improve journalistic practices and the structural conditions journalism occurs within can only be a good thing. 

JITP's special issue on YouTube and the 2008 Election Cycle in the United States is out

Journal of Information Technology & Politics, Volume 7 Issue 2 & 3 2010

Kevin Wallsten's article is free to non-subscribers. Here's the lineup:

GUEST EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

YouTube and the 2008 Election Cycle in the United States — Michael Xenos

RESEARCH PAPERS

Congressional Candidates’ Use of YouTube in 2008: Its Frequency and Rationale — Girish J. “Jeff” Gulati and Christine B. Williams

The Sidetracked 2008 YouTube Senate Campaign — Robert J. Klotz

YouTube Politics: YouChoose and Leadership Rhetoric During the 2008 Election — Scott H. Church

Macaca Moments Reconsidered: Electoral Panopticon or Netroots Mobilization? — David Karpf

“Yes We Can”: How Online Viewership, Blog Discussion, Campaign Statements, and Mainstream Media Coverage Produced a Viral Video Phenomenon — Kevin Wallsten

Online Video “Friends” Social Networking: Overlapping Online Public Spheres in the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election — Scott P. Robertson, Ravi K. Vatrapu, and Richard Medina

A New Opportunity for Democratic Engagement: The CNN-YouTube Presidential Candidate Debates — LaChrystal Ricke

REVIEW ESSAY

The Obamachine: Technopolitics 2.0 — Cheris A. Carpenter

WORKBENCH NOTE

Supporting Research Data Collection from YouTube with TubeKit — Chirag Shah

KEYNOTE LECTURE

Internet Research: The Question of Method: A Keynote Address from the YouTube and the 2008 Election Cycle in the United States Conference — Richard Rogers

 

New book released: Diffused War

Polity today published War and Media: The Emergence of Diffused War, by Andrew Hoskins and Ben O'Loughlin. 

War is diffused through a complex mesh of our everyday media. Paradoxically, this both facilitates and contains the presence and power of enemies near and far. The conventions of so-called traditional warfare have been splintered by the availability and connectivity of the principal locus of war today: the electronic and digital media. Hoskins and O’Loughlin identify and illuminate the conditions of what they term diffused war and the new challenges it raises for the actors who wage and counter warfare, for their agents and mechanisms of the new media and for mass publics.

This book offers an invaluable review of the key literature and presents a fresh approach to the understanding of the dynamic relationships between war and media. It will be welcomed by military and media practitioners as well as by students of war and media courses across media, communication and cultural studies, politics and international relations, sociology, journalism, and security studies.

Early reviews: 

"In today′s new environment of an apparent never–ending war on terror, governments put together their media strategy with as much care as they construct their military one. This important book helps us understand the fragile relationship between war and media and examine it with a fresh and informed eye."
Phillip Knightley, author of The First Casualty, a history of war correspondents and propaganda

"The most singular feature of Hoskins and O′Loughlin′s′ achievement in their comprehensive sweep of scholarship in this multi–disciplinary field of war and media is its critical assessment of existing paradigms and theories, and the development of new ones. The work represents an important and ground–breaking milestone in the development of this relatively new specialism about one of the oldest and most important spheres of human experience."
Joseph Oliver Boyd–Barrett, Bowling Green State University

"Whether we approach the field of contemporary war and communications through preferred optics of ′control′, ′chaos′ or perhaps ′complexity′, this book challenges us all – and rightly so. It invites us to take seriously how today′s media ecology not only mediates contemporary wars, but becomes insinuated inside the course and conduct of warfare itself."
Simon Cottle, Cardiff University

Citizenship without community - podcasts

Citizenship - its legal, political, cultural and social status - has been the subject of much reconsideration in the past decade, driven by the collision of multiculturalism, security and migration in what for many have been turbulent times. We have not always seen the provision of rights by states or the fulfilment of duties by citizens, leading to a search for radical alternatives among some. But it seems contrarian to consider the possibility of a citizenship independent of any political community - a citizenship of humanity, for instance - since rights and duties must be enacted through some institutional structure, and such structures tend to map onto political collectives like cities, regions or nations. And underlying these debates, a crisis of representation has been mooted: voters don't trust representatives enough to authorise them to make decisions "in my name", media don't allow for the representation of complex problems like climate change or economic crises, and the concept of representation itself has been abandoned by philosophers and, indeed, media theorists like Richard Grusin. What it means to be a citizen, in a connected, efficacious relationship to politics and public problems, is, today, a fundamental problem.

So thanks to Angharad Closs Stephens and Vicki Squire for organising the Citizenship Without Community conference last week at the British Library. Podcasts of the talks are available here, including for me the most provocative by Prof. Étienne Balibar. Unfortunately, it was only in the Q&A that he addressed the crisis of representation for democracy and communication (for him, it is more of a phenomenological problem than a simple matter of institutions and practices), but his talk on the "impossibility" of a community of citizens, minus that Q&A, is here.

Final TV debate: policy substance matters little to voters

Linguamatics’ linguistic analysis with NPCU provided insight last night into tweet sentiment towards party leaders during the final televised UK election debate and was immediately picked by Rory Cellan-Jones at the BBC. The preliminary results from tweets sent during the debate, including a new view on the instant reactions to particular issues (Figure 1), showed a further narrowing of the gap between the leaders’ performances (Figure 2), but with Nick Clegg still performing best overall.

Figure 1: How twitterers reacted to particular issues in the final debate

Figure 1

The overall tweet analysis (Figure 2) for the three debates shows the percentage of tweets in favour of each of the leaders. Nick Clegg’s share has dropped to 37% from 43% in the second debate, Gordon Brown is down to 32% from 35%, while David Cameron rose to 31% from 22%.

Figure 2: Number of tweets showing positive sentiment towards each party leader

Figure 2

Top issues for the twitterers in the third debate (Figure 3 below) were immigration, banking, economy and tax. Clegg and Brown shared the lead on immigration, Clegg was ahead on banking and tax, whilst Brown clearly won on the economy. The fact that Camercon didn't win any issues of policy substance, but nevertheless improved his performance, suggested viewers are not assessing the leaders on policy specifics - hardly a revelation of course. Try as Labour might to shift the terrain onto policy,  viewers' connection to the leaders is shaped by matters of personality, body language and other factors which Brown performs relatively poorly on. Brown walloped his rivals on the topic of the economy, but didn't win the debate.

Figure 3: Winner per topic from number of relevant positive tweets

Figure 3

Tracking positive sentiment towards each of the leaders during all three debates (Figure 4) also reflects the narrowing gap between their performances.

Figure 4: Positive sentiment towards leader over time during the debate

Figure 4

The published results come from the deep analysis of 187,000 tweets sent by 43,656 twitterers from 8.30pm – 10.00pm on the night of the third televised UK election debate.

Linguamatics’ I2E text mining software was used to find and summarize tweets that have the same meaning, however they are worded. I2E identifies the range of vocabulary used in tweets and uses linguistic analysis to collect and summarize the different ways opinion is expressed.

Description of the figures

Figure 1 shows how the twitterers reacted to particular issues during the debate.
This is a timeline showing the positive tweets made about each leader in relation to audience questions or key statements made by a leader

Figure 2 shows the number of tweets that expressed a positive sentiment towards each of the party leaders.
The analysis identified tweets saying that a particular leader was doing well or made a good point, or that they like the leader, etc. Linguistic filtering removed examples which were about expectations, e.g. “I hope the leader will do well”, questions, such as “anyone think the leader is doing well?”, and negations, such as “the leader did not do well” or “the leader made no sense”.

Figure 3 shows winner per topic from number of relevant positive tweets.
The analysis identified a list of topics by identifying words or phrases which described the discussion subject, for example Trident, nuclear weapons, armed forces, military, and Eurofighter are assigned to defence. The tweets were then analyzed to find out who was saying positive things about each leader in relation to a specific topic.

Figure 4 shows Figure 1 (positive sentiment towards leaders over time during the debate) compared with the positive sentiment results from the two earlier debates.

5 May film event: Watching the Daily Life

The Reflections of Turkey-EU Relations Beyond Politics: Watching the Daily Life

We would like to invite you to our workshop and the screening of the
film ’Coffee Futures’ by Dr. Zeynep Gursel from the University of
Michigan. The event is co-organized by the Department of Media Arts and
the Department of Politics and International Relations at Royal
Holloway, University of London:

Title of the event: “The Reflections of Turkey-EU Relations Beyond
Politics: Watching the Daily Life”

Date: Wednesday 5 May 2010, 4-7pm
Venue: Windsor Building Auditorium, RHUL, Egham

The event is open to public and free.

There will be refreshments and a wine reception.

Details of the film are here.

For any queries please contact: Ayca Tunc (A.Tunc@rhul.ac.uk) or Didem
Buhari (M.D.Buhari@rhul.ac.uk)

Programme
16:00 Opening remarks by H.E. Mr. Yigit Alpogan, Ambassador of the
Republic of Turkey

16:10 First presentation on Turkish public opinion by Didem Buhari and
Baris Gulmez(Royal Holloway, Department of Politics and International
Relations)

16:30 Screening of the film ’Coffee Futures’ and Q&A by Zeynep Devrim
Gursel(http://www.coffeefuturesfilm.com/)

17:20 Coffee break

17:40 Prof. Chris Rumford’s talk (Royal Holloway, Department of
Politics and International Relations)

18:00 Second presentation on the reception of Turkish-German filmmakers
in the Turkish press by Ayca Tunc (Royal Holloway,Department of Media
Arts)

18:20 Q&A session

18:30 Conclusion remarks by Dr. Daniela Berghahn(Royal Holloway,
Department of Media Arts)

18:40 Wine reception