Why did Hillary lose (or why did Obama win?)

[I've been writing this on and off in spare moments since Saturday, so apologies if it is a bit stream of consciousness like].

 

Wow. After nearly a year and a half it is finally over. The most remarkable political contest I have ever seen for sure, and I would venture to argue the most amazing thing seen in American politics since at least 1968, if not more. After that, it seems quite likely the general election itself will be something of an anti-climax. But now seems a good moment to offer some provisional and very sketchy answers on how the whole thing turned out the way it did. I'm not alone in this undertaking. Today's papers were littered with pieces analysing the outcome (here, here and here for a few) and Daily Kos (here, here, here and here for some examples) has been running a symposium on just this subject.

The first thing that came into my head was what to call this post. The original version is the unbracketed title above, namely "why did Hillary lose?". I added the additional bit because it seemed a little unfair not to acknowledge Obama's achievements. But, despite all of Barack Obama's manifold political achievements, it does seem more compelling to focus on Hillary Clinton, as her candidacy fits neatly into a broader story - an epic story at that - about the Clintons and the generation they are a part of. In this sense, her campaign is part of a curve in American politics that starts with the spike in birthrate in the postwar period, and continues as that generation has its political consciousness shaped by the Vietnam war and the events of 1968. 2008 might mark the last chapter in forty year journey, the end of what Obama refers to in the Audacity of Hope as "the psychodrama of the baby boomers". In the shorter term too, we only need to go back about a year and it would have been hard to find more than a handful of commentators arguing anything other than Clinton's inevitability. Undoubtedly, something did go horribly wrong for her campaign, even though Obama skilfully exploited the opportunity it presented.

So here is my, very provisional list of thoughts (and I also have to give a hat tip to my friend Jon, who I had email exchange with on this subject a few months back which has done a lot to shape my views on the question, although the decision as to which arguments to include and how to phrase - and thus their shortcomings - are entirely my own). Just before I begin though, I want to make one more point. I don't believe their was a mono-causal reason for Hillary's defeat. For that reason, I reject arguments such as that articulated by Maureen Dowd in the New York Times: "She didn’t lose because she was a woman. She didn’t lose because America isn’t ready for a woman as president. She lost because of her own — and her husband’s and Mark Penn’s — fatal missteps." I think this misses the point. Hillary's defeat and Obama's victory was a perfect storm, bought about my a multitude of factors. Change any one of them and it is possible to conceive a different result. With that in mind, here we go (ideas are sketched into headers, with other key points highlighted). 

The war. I'm sure history will judge this as being hugely important to Hillary's defeat. It was, but a big caveat need to be thrown in: I'm pretty sure she still could have won with it hanging round her neck. But it had three significant impacts. Firstly, it gave Obama his opening. Because he'd opposed the war from the beginning, in contrast to any other candidates in the race, he could use this stance to justify his position in the race. Secondly, the war vote allowed older doubts about the Clintons on the more radical wing of the Democratic Party to solidify and create hardened opposition. Thirdly, and finally, many of the networks and communities which Obama was able to exploit, were created in the aftermath to the Iraq war on blogs and Democratic-supporting websites. This was especially important to Obama's fundraising success. Which leads neatly too...

The Internet. The Obama campaign got it, as did many of their supporters. If you've been following the campaign over at TechPresident this much is quite clear (as Micah Sifry suggests in his post-primary season essay on the subject). As the famous Apple / Think Different video illustrated the power of a creative commons approach to campaigning. I do think the really important thing to grasp though is the Obama campaign was in reality a hybrid. It harnessed the best bits of Howard Dean's open source mentality for sure, but in its ruthless approach to data-management it also borrowed heavily from the Bush campaign in 2004. It success was found in a combination of collective activity, open source campaigning and information management. The most obvious example of this can be seen in fundraising, which simultaneously managed to be very centralised (as anyone on the Obama email list will know - messages were posted perfectly in synch with campaign events) but also relied on a decentralised network to publicise and galvanise supporters. In many ways, the great achievement of the Obama campaign was appreciating that these two approaches to politics were not mutually exclusive.


Fundraising. I mentioned fundraising above. But really... fundraising. Obama's success (and for that matter Clinton's, at least in comparison with everyone else ever to compete in a primary other than Barack Obama) was mind blowing. But two points. Firstly, it did have an impact. In 2007, Obama's money making made him look viable. Later on, it made it look possible that he might achieve the holy grail - being able to opt out of general election, as well as primary season, state funding. Secondly though, fundraising (or more specifically the power it gave Obama to buy lots and lots of TV advertising) had a pretty negligible impact. In many of the late primaries, Obama outspent Clinton 3-to-1. And it had no impact on the voting blocs and who they supported.
   
This was a change election. I've seen this written so many times, and I'm still not really sure what the term means - especially when John McCain is still polling somewhere north of 40 per cent. Clearly not everyone in the US thinks it is a change election. But it is also true that there is a sense - after Iraq, Katrina and economic slow down - of real Bush fatigue. A bigger and academically-grounded theme, bought out in Michael Hais and Morley Winograd's book Millennial Makeover, is the idea that the US is in the middle of one of its recurring political realignments, wherein political power shifts from one generation to another. It is this idea that brings us to the concept of post Baby boomer politics and also might explain Obama's support from younger voters. If that is the case, newness was good. 

Hillary ran as an incumbent.
Because the electorate were not happy with the status quo, Hillary's decision to dwell on her experience and the nineties was a big mistake (not least because this raised fears of dynastic politics - Bush, Clinton, Bush, Clinton anyone? Although a voxpop with a young voter on this subject a few months back came up with my very favourite line of the whole election: "We're for Obama. We don't want royal families. We don't want Bush, Clinton, Bush, Clinton. We want Obama. He's our Robert Kennedy". Ahhh, the irony). Of course, this might have made sense in 2004. It might have even made sense if there had been no Obama. But with the fresh-faced nearly shop new Senator from Illinois in the race, it was a dreadful error. Aside from his perennially popular anti-war statement, Obama had virtually no history for people to judge him on. As a result, voters were able to project all their political desires onto him. Clinton backers might have asked "what the hell does hope actually mean?" - but failed to figure out the real problem. It could mean anything voters wanted it to, especially in the early stages the campaign when Obama was running strongly as a post-partisan candidate.

Hillary had all the disadvantages of being the establishment candidate, but not all the advantages. Despite the fact that she ran as an uber-insider, Hillary didn't actually gain all the benefits one might have expected to from this position. While she got a good lead in super-delegates early on it was far from decisive, and she got little help from the party establishment later in the race, when the likes of Howard Dean and Nancy Pelosi did a lot of harm to her campaign, while remaining technically neutral. Other senior Democrats, most notably Ted Kennedy openly came out and endorsed Obama. Why did this happen? I suspect it was because, despite their political successes, the Clintons was never really true party insiders. They were certainly not liked when they came up to Washington in 1992, and despite his political recovery culminating in re-election, Bill Clinton was never able to do much to help Democrats down the ballot running for other offices. And maybe senior Democrats were wary of a return to the Clinton dramas of the nineties. The support the Clintons gained early on was largely due to their power. When that power began to ebb, then so did the support. In contrast, the fact she was seen as a Washington insider killed her.   

2004, 2006 and 2008. I think one also needs to look at the circumstances of previous elections in order understand the collective decision making processes at work in the Democratic Party this time around. In 2004, they rejected Dean and instead went for the safe option of Kerry, and look where it got them. 2006 was a different story. They fought across the country and bought their opposition to the war front and centre... and won out (this lesson shows something of a capacity for partially remembering history, of course - the Democrats chose plenty of centrist candidates during that election, and they lost the most ideologically charged contest in Conneticut). But these two electoral experiences seemed to give the Democrats a taste for risk taking. 

Sectional voting patterns. This really was an election in two parts. Although it seems a long, long time ago now, Obama was originally spoken of as the candidate who was going to unite people, regardless of race, gender, class or even political leanings. The first crack appeared in this edifice when Clinton won the New Hampshire primary and the Nevada caucus - in New Hampshire, women turned out to vote for her, while in Nevada it was noted that, despite support from major labour unions, Obama was not getting the support from Hispanics. This took us into a second electoral phase, were support for both sides was frozen and largely predictable. By super Tuesday, the super-voting blocs, almost evening matched in size were arranged against each other. On Obama's side, there were African Americans, upscale voters and young people. On Hillary's side there were women, traditional working class Democrats and Hispanics. And it pretty much stayed that way for the next four months (for a good and detailed account of electoral coalitions, check out this set of Real Clear Politics essays on the subject - this is part one, use the links at the top to access the other three parts). Only rarely, as occurred at Wisconsin for example, was either side able to break through. By and large, we could have guessed every primary result from Super Tuesday through to the end with what we knew about voting patterns that had occurred up to that point. It just so happened that Obama's coalition was a little bit bigger, and he was better at mobilising it (especially in caucuses) than Clinton's was. This leads me to one of the more controversal points I want to make...

Hillary didn't go negative soon enough. I'm sure many will disagree. But I think a good argument can be made that Clinton didn't go negative at Obama early enough. Lets be clear what I mean by this. I don't mean some of the more brazen nastiness that has (rightly or wrongly) been linked with the Clinton campaign (such as this or this ). I mean a more deliberate and systematic attempt to question Obama's experience and wisdom, and compare it with Clinton.

This is most famous ad of the campaign, and it does exactly that. However, it was only deployed before the Texas primary. Although it may have helped in that campaign, it wasn't enough to get Clinton to prevail overall. The reasons, I think, is that sectional voting patterns had already become really solidified. People judged the argument through the prism of already being strongly supportive of a candidate - in other words, they saw what they wanted to see: inexperienced Barack verses level headed Hillary, or an evil Clinton hatchet job. Which leaves me asking: what would have happened if this ad had been deployed before these patterns had developed? Would the 3am ad have even been as a negative ad? After all, it focuses on Hillary's skills. It was only negative in Texas because she was in a one-on-one run off with an opponent who she was trying to label inexperienced. I think the root cause of this problem was very simple - in December or January, when this ad might have made a difference, the Clinton camp were simply not taking Obama seriously enough to think about running it. If one wanted to go a bit deeper into the dark art of politics, there is also a question as to whether the Clinton people were doing their op-research well enough. Why, for example, did they not turn up the Reverend Wright clips? When these did come out, they were certainly a problem for Obama (and might still prove to be a problem for him in November). But his primary coalition was, by this time, solid enough that it barely budged in response to the flap. Had this story come out in January, things might have been very different. 


Heisenberg uncertainty principle
. In particular, the idea that act of observing something changes its behaviour. This worked at two levels in this campaign. Firstly, the Clinton campaign was built on established wisdom from politicians, journalists and academics (yes, I got it mindboggling wrong too). Momentum was everything. The campaign could not go on beyond Super Tuesday. It might be over in Iowa and New Hampshire if a candidate could score two clean wins. For that reason the campaign planned insufficiently for small states and contests after Super Tuesday. That would cost them during Obama long run of wins in February and March. In contrast, the Obama people didn't buy this idea. They understood it was a contest about delegates, where Clinton's momentum could be offset by racking up large wins in small states. Secondly, the observers themselves - the press - proved to be a vital constituency. It is probably going to far to say they were Obama's base (Clinton after all had some big cheerleaders in the national media), but they helped his cause a lot.

Also a shoutout for Saturday night live, who seemed to really hit the right note a few times during the course of the campaign. 

The electoral system. Clinton was unlucky in one major respect. The electoral system did not help her one bit. A key element here was the order of the primaries. Had one of "her" states voted straight after Super Tuesday instead of all being six weeks later, things might have been very different. Secondly, it is hard to imagine two states that could have caused Hillary more problems by discounting themselves than Florida and Michigan. Of course there is lots of internal state politics involved, but I wonder would have happened had it been, for example, Washington State and South Carolina that had moved themselves up?

Cock ups. Bad luck on the rules cannot excuse some serious cock ups on behalf of the Clintonistas. The biggest mistake she made was an inability to handle caucuses. And the anti-established wisdom excuse holds no water here - her campaign should have known that insurgent candidates always do well in this form of competition, because they have a motivated support base. There is also (frequently verified) story of Mark Penn not understanding the rules of the California primary. In the last weeks, the Clinton campaign became fond of arguing that, under a winner takes all system, they would have won. True enough, and this contest has demonstrated some problems with a proportional system. But the Obama people factored proportionately into their strategy - they knew that winning small states big was as good or better than winning big states small. 

Sexism and race. Aside from the drama of the whole contest, future historians will undoubtedly focus on an historic election which pitted the first viable African American candidate against the first viable female candidate. This had unfortunate consequences. At times there have been very unseemly conversations about whether blacks and women were historically sinned against to a greater degree and which group "deserved" the presidency first. I certainly don't want to enter into these, not least because I think it starts an argument that can't be won. But I do accept a point Peter Tatchell made last year about different forms of discrimination and prejudice. They aren't equal, either in their absolute outcomes, in their acceptability or the impact they have on our political culture. This manifested itself in a number of ways. I was pretty shocked as to how people (rightly) spoke of "Obama's historic candidacy" but neglected to mention "Hillary's historic candidacy", which, like her or hate her, it undoubtedly was. I suspect this was because people were so familiar with the former First Lady and got used to the idea that she would win the nomination last year; on that basis it didn't capture their imagination in the same way. I also think it is fair to say that people are much more touchy about race than they are about gender - racial jokes for example, have a complete red line around them, gender, not so much so. I don't think we can quantify the impact this had on the race, but it certainly changed the narrative of events. The issue of race also gave Obama one huge advantage - he could make an amazing speech on it, and gather the plaudits. Obama deserves a lot of credit for the speech and its content, but the issue of gender did not and never could afford the same opportunity to look statesman (or stateswoman) like. 

There is one more interesting point to be made about race and gender. Obama's candidacy generated intellectual unity across the generations of African American supporters, ranging from old style civil rights activists such as Jesse Jackson to younger, professionals. In contrast, Clinton's candidacy cut to the heart of the division between second-wave feminists (who tended to support her) and younger post-feminists, who were more likely to go for Obama, or at least regard the Clinton candidacy as a far less important struggle. So this division was not just generational, but intellectual (as this excellent Slate piece outlines). Obama didn't have to contend with a division like this.

Human interventions. Finally, two people deserve special mention. I suspect we don't really know the impact of Bill Clinton on this election. Before hand, he was regarded as a huge asset to Hillary. Then, in South Carolina, it all went a bit wrong for him. And throughout the campaign, he intermittently caused problems. But he was also did a lot of quiet campaigning, especially in the rural parts of later states that might have proved decisive. I suspect he did damage her on occasions, but without him, she would have had to drop out sooner. And secondly, John Edwards. Obama owes him a big thank you. Whether intentionally or not, he was a huge help. Iowa might have turned out very differently without him running, and Clinton could have run Obama a lot closer. He also dropped out at just the right moment for Obama, when the latter was firmly established as the major anti-Clinton candidate and needed to coalesce his support.

So what does everyone else think?

Will a photo help the Democrats win in November?

I have to confess, I don't think the Democrats have got hold of John McCain yet, in terms of structuring a message to beat him in the presidential contest. The narrative they are running on seems to be that McCain is Bush mark II (hence the third term and McSame slogans). In some ways, this makes sense. Obama has run as the change candidate thus far and has been very successful, so he looks a good bet if he can brand his general election opponent as the continuity candidate. It will also not cause much harm to remind everyone that his opponent is a member of the same party as the incumbent, very unpopular president. But I still don't really buy it. McCain isn't the same as Bush. He's frequently opposed the administration and has a long track record of bipartisanship in the senate (most famously on campaign finance reform). Whatever one thinks of his politics, it really is quite hard to imagine the worst excesses of the Bush administration taking place under McCain. So I just feel - and have for a while - that the Democrats aren't going down the best line on this one.

But... and it's potentially a big but... there is one thing that I think might turn out to be highly influential in the coming election, and may make the Democrats narrative much more powerful, at least if it takes hold in the popular imagination. A number of historic examples indicate how a single image can define a candidate. Rather than anything he has done in his time as a senator, maybe McCain will be defined by this picture, already quite prominent in the blogosphere.

bush-mccain-hug-72.jpg

So what's wrong here? It isn't so much the fact that Bush and McCain are embracing, but the body language of the two men. Bush looks regal, almost dismissive of his would-be successer. McCain, on the other hand seems to be pulling Bush closer, desperate to embace him. There is an odd role reversal thing going onto, with McCain, the older man, almost childlike in the way he is holding Bush. This image has everything the Democrats want to get across: Bush's arrogance and McCain's subservience. It will be interesting to see if this photo keeps reappearing over the course of the campaign.

This picture reminded me of something, and it took me a long time to figure out what. And then I remembered. A photograph that did a great deal to undermine the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War (for the full story of this photo, see here).

cop-breznef-honecker.JPG

Keeping campaign weblog comments on message

I haven't really looked at this systematically, although doubtless it would be an interesting exercise to do so, but an thought occurred to me today as I was perusing Hillary Clinton's campaign website. Consider these two posts. Firstly, this post comes from the 3rd June, just after Hillary had won in South Dakota. During her speech that night she said she wasn't going to make any decisions, and encouraged people to go to her website and tell her what they wanted her to do. The feedback is almost universally pro-Hillary fighting on. Furthermore, it seems to echo her electability talking point with lots of threats not to vote for Obama. I did a quick keyword search for the word "unify" and found it was used in one comment (sorry, doesn't allow for hyper-linking to individual comments, so it is at 7.30 on the 4th June) out of more than four hundred. So at that moment in time, everyone commenting on the Clinton blog was, almost to a person, following the party line. For that to have occurred, you really have to assume that there is some kind of moderation strategy in place. It is just too lop-sided. 

But look at this blog post, from earlier today. In it, Clinton suspends her campaign and endorses Obama to be the next President of the US. But something has changed between now and Tuesday - there are plenty of comments that are rejecting Hillary's argument. For example (12:25, 5th June):

My heart is breaking, I know she would have been the best President this nation has ever had. I love Hillary and if she ever runs again I will be there for her. I will not support Obama, he is a radical. I will not support the DNC they are so screwed up. I will now turn my attention to John McCain and I will always be a Hillary Democrat. I love all of you and know Hillary has to do what she feels is best. God bless everyone on this web site and thank you for all your hard work, and lifting spirits when the press would knock us way down.

God bless America and all who have been hurt by the Democratic Party.

And there are plenty more like that. Additionally, it should be noted that there are some comment also saying Hillary voters should support Obama. In other words, discussion has broken out in what previously seemed a very sterile environment. I think of two reasons for this happening, one cynical, one very realist. The cynical one is that resentment in the Hillary camp means that they don't care that much about the new message and are perfectly happy to let their supporters discuss how much they dislike Obama and how they aren't going to vote for him come November. The more realistic explanation (and I suspect the true one) is that Hillary Clinton's campaign apparatus has completely collapsed - she isn't paying her staff anymore, who are probably all complete nervous wrecks anyway, after the past six months. But the odd thing is this. Out of that chaos is emerging a much more organic discussion environment, where Hillary supporters are voicing their feelings directly to each other.

How far has digital journalism come?

 digital_journalism_2.jpg

(Images originally from MBC On Focus, 28 May; reproduced here)

When I was doing my MA a few years back, a tutor mentioned one day that Korean pro-democracy student activists looked like well-trained soldiers when they threw Molotov cocktails. I don't remember why the topic was brought up in the first place but I remember being quite surprised at learning the existence of such a reputation outside the country. After the mid-1990s, however, street protests of such kind seem to have become a thing of the past. Or at least replaced by a more pacific version. Since 2002, when there was a series of commemorations for the two teenage girls killed in a vehicle accident caused by two American soldiers, protests have invariably taken the form of candlelight vigils in Jongro Square, Central Seoul. And it was the case with the one against the beef import deal, too. Until last weekend. After 16 times of candlelight rallies in vain, frustrated protesters eventually stayed gathered until early in the morning [* according to the Korean law, you need a pre-granted permission to protest and you can't protest after the sun sets] and some of them started to march on the roadway until they all were taken to the police station. The police also announced that they intend to arrest anyone who violates the law on public assembly and demonstrations. In this context, the biggest issue in Korean cyberspace at the moment is whether the authorities' hard-handed reaction is justifiable. What makes the citizen protesters angrier is not the embedded violation of human rights by the current legal framework in general. The reason is rather that the rallies are NOT "ideologically motivated" like the authorities and the pro-government media define. I am by no means saying that it's okay to be hard-handed via-à-vis ideologically motivated activism, but the point to be made here is the mass of protesters this time, which the authorities said they would take any necessary measures to stop, is indeed composed of those who wouldn't usually be engaged in collective action like this: mums that brought their children with them, teenagers after school, young ladies in their high heels, etc. Therefore, those who have been participating in the rallies and those who sympathise with the protesters flood online discussion forums and comment boxes on news portals with the question, "Hundreds of riot police with their shields? Are we really in 2008 or in the 1980s?" On the other hand, the authorities' argument is that that what's illegal is illegal, it was the citizen protesters that turned violent first, and the police only reacted to that.

 

It shouldn't be my place to say which account is what exactly happened because I wasn't there, but what I dread to notice is the striking similarity between what the authorities of today say and what the military government in the 1980s said when they sent paratroopers to major cities to quell pro-democracy protests. The Gwangju Massacre in May 1980 had been officially regarded as a rebellion inspired by communist sympathisers, and it took almost a decade before it received recognition as an effort to restore democracy from military rule. The police appeal that it is not fair to compare what's happening now with what happened in the 1980s, given how things have changed. I know there has been no gun, no tear gas, etc. I don't think, however, that the comparison is meant to be a simple equating anyway. It's more about the fear of "going backwards in democracy". Can we blame someone for being shy after bitten once?

 

Hence, while rallying, today's protesters in Korea also live-broadcast their rallies through their mobile phones, webcams and laptops. This is not just to mobilise more people but, perhaps more importantly, to protect themselves from potential government propaganda and media distortion against them. In other words, they are making sure that the rest at their homes see that there are no pro-communists behind the protests and that no violence is initiated by the protesters.

 

Liberal news media like Hankyoreh, OhmyNews and MBC (above) put welcoming spotlight on this phenomenon, commenting that this is a new version of digital journalism. Sounds cool and cutting edge, but saddens me personally. One of my interviewees, who happened to have been directly exposed to the 'Gwangju Uprising', told me that he was really shocked when he moved to Seoul immediately after the incident and found that people in Seoul had no idea what'd happened in Gwangju and vaguely guessed that it was a rebellion orchestrated by pro-communists, just like the government and the pro-government media said. He added that he regretted that things would have been different if there had been for the Internet. The first model of DIY journalism, OhmyNews, was born in Korea and now a version two. What's going on is unfortunate enough, but I also find it sad that the impressive level of technological sophistication that Korean civil society is often associated with in the literature seems acquired out of necessity.

Grauniad unlimited

It is nice to see that, even in the age of the web, old habits die hard. In particular, the copy editors at the Guardian at still earning their money, even on Michael White's politicsblog. Apparently,

Friends report seeing David Miliband here at the very wet Hay Festival. He was spotted in the audience for Gene Robinson, the openly-Christian American bishop, and for ex-President Jimmy Carter, at 83, twice his age, who apparently told him he was too young to be foreign secretary. Thanks Jimmy.

 An openly Christian Bishop? Who'd have thought.

The long tail of information

OK, we all know this, but still every time I encounter it, it just blows me a way.

I stumbled on a random fact the other day about the time people spend shopping. Apparently the Norwegians spend the least, Canadians spend the most. I mentioned my new and very exciting fact to Stephanie Carvin, a lecturer in the Department here who happens to be Canadian. Stephanie's explanation for it (aside from the fact that Canadians just like shopping...) was that Canada is jammed full of huge malls and that these aren't only commercial centres, but act as community resources, where people meet, socialise, and access services. That seemed pretty plausible, although we had no idea how many shopping malls there were in Norway.

So I'm back at my desk and curiosity takes over. I open up firefox and type "shopping malls in Canada" into Google. First hit is this article in Wikipedia. A couple of clicks later (via this page), I get to this list, of shopping malls in Norway. There are about fifty shopping malls in the whole of Norway, and lots, lots more in Canada (sorry - there are actually far too many to count). I reckon, even on a per head basis, Stephanie is right. Additionally, the Canadian centres are a lot bigger, while the largest Norwegian shopping centre only has hundred fifty shops in it.

But here's the point. I could have been in any research library in the world, and I don't think there is anyway I could have located that piece of information as quickly. In fact, it seems fairly likely I would never have been able to find it in that form, laid out perfectly for addressing my specific query.

The amazing thing though is that the list I found hadn't been created by a single individual who chose to sit down and compile it. Nor was it put together with an express single purpose in mind. Instead, it was manufactured by hundreds, perhaps thousands of atomised individuals, all with their singular motivations and interests. But these micro-level actions led to a macro-outcome: creating a resource that previously would not have existed. The remarkable thing then is not just ease or the speed with which we can now access information, but also the ability of web 2.0 environments to extract inputs from multiple sources, and remodel and reorganise them again and again, to make that information more and more useful. That is unprecedented.

Notes from the YouGovStone/FT Ask the Experts event on the US election

Digital Politics: Effects of the Information Age on the 2008 U.S. Election and Beyond, US Embassy May 15, 2008

Panellists:

  • Phil Noble (US) Noble & Associates, Washington DC, Founder – PoliticsOnline
  • Dr Andrew Chadwick (UK), Head, Department of Politics and International Relations and Director, New Political Communication Unit, Royal Holloway, University of London
  • Joanna Shields (US) International President, Bebo
  • Jimmy Leach (UK) Director of Digital Communications, Freud Communications and former Head of Digital Communications for the Prime Minister’s Office

Last night I was one of the panellists at this event. It was a lively and interesting debate, with a good range of perspectives and lots of opportunities for audience members to ask questions. Gideon Rachman from the FT was a superb chair, even managing to squeeze in several email questions along the way. You can also view the webcast here. Carole Stone of YouGovStone and the staff at the US Embassy made us feel very welcome while we waited in the Benjamin Franklin room and during the drinks reception that followed.

First up was Phil Noble, now something of an internet campaign veteran. Phil spoke enthusiastically about the Obama campaign and of how the metrics of success for judging campaigns were now evolving. There were some remarkable statistics about Obama’s online fundraising – currently around the quarter of a million dollar mark.

I followed Phil. My talk - The 2008 Digital Campaign: What's New and Why Things Will (Almost) Always Be Different in the UK - was divided between making four basic points about the current campaign before providing a brief snapshot of mine and Nick Anstead’s research on the interplay between the internet and party institutions and electoral environment. The text of my speech is included below this summary.

Joanna Shields, International President of Bebo, one of the biggest social networking sites and soon to be acquired by AOL, came next, with an interesting perspective on the activities of young people away from the formal politics of voting.

Finally, Jimmy Leach brought us all down to earth with a dose of scepticism, not to mention humour, about politicians’ abilities to adapt to the new communication environment. For example, will the openness of the network campaign continue when a candidate enters office? Not likely, Jimmy suggested.

Webcast.

Gideon Rachman’s blog entry at the FT.

YouGovStone site.

PoliticsOnline

 

Here’s what I said…

The 2008 Digital Campaign: What's New, and Why Things Will (Almost) Always Be Different in the UK

First, I want to highlight four big themes in online campaigning that we’ve seen - so far - in the 2008 electoral cycle in the United States.

Second, as a political scientist, I’ll briefly consider a major puzzle: why has the internet had a greater impact on parties and election campaigning in the United States than it has in the UK?

So, what’s new and interesting in the 2008 US electoral cycle?

First : it seems to me that the internet is coming of age as a platform for political discourse. It has moved from the model of static pages toward a means of enabling a wide range of goals to be achieved through networked software services. Joanna Shields’ company, Bebo, is obviously a significant part of this general trend.

A second big theme of this election is collective intelligence in online campaigning. A distributed network of creators and contributors, the majority of them amateurs, can, using simple online tools, produce information goods that may better those produced by so-called authoritative sources. Though this is not entirely new - we saw this emerge with Howard Dean in 2004 - we now have a recognisable and proven campaigning model. It is based on online venues loosely meshed together through automated linking technologies, particularly blogs and social networking applications.

The internet now enables ongoing citizen vigilance on a grand scale. Political actors and media elites now inhabit an always-on environment in which it is impossible to escape the “little brother” surveillant gaze of citizen-reporters, from Twitter feeds to Flickr photostreams of marches and demonstrations ignored by mainstream media, to video bloggers and their YouTube uploads. One good example here is Mayhill Fowler, the citizen journalist who first published Barack Obama’s now infamous ‘Bittergate’ remarks a few weeks ago.

A third big theme is that online video is now much more important than it was. YouTube has made a sizeable dent in earlier predictions of the emergence of the slick televisual online campaign, able only to be resourced by wealthy politicians. YouTube video conversations are often effective precisely because they don’t depend upon professional media production techniques.

And what are people watching on YouTube? Well, alongside the countless videos of people using Mentos candy to explode bottles of diet Coke, we find citizens watching unedited 37-minute long political speeches! Consider Obama’s ‘More Perfect Union’ speech delivered in Philadelphia a couple of months ago. By last week, almost 5.5 million people had watched that speech in its entirety. We know this because YouTube does not count partial viewings. Micah Sifry of the Techpresident blog, who we had as a speaker at a recent conference on the politics of web 2.0 at Royal Holloway, has spoken of this as a shift from the sound bite to the sound blast.

My fourth and final big theme is that data are now everything. Those who can successfully mine, refine and subsequently protect it are more likely to emerge as dominant. But the interesting thing is that most of these data have been created by the labor of volunteers and they may simply be the by-products of countless distributed and coincidental interactions. Election campaigns in the United States are now characterized by obsessive and continuous recalibration in response to instant online polls, fundraising drives, comments lists on YouTube video pages, and blog posts. But the key point is that informational value emerges from a combination of distributed user generated content and its centralized exploitation. It blends the campaign war room with the campaign network.

So, briefly, to an interesting puzzle: Why has the internet had a greater impact on parties and election campaigning in the United States than it has in the United Kingdom?

This is a quick snapshot of a forthcoming research paper that I’ve co-authored with my colleague, Nick Anstead.

To answer this question we need to understand how the internet interacts with political institutions - in particular, the organization of political parties and the norms and rules of the electoral environment. These vary greatly across political systems.

So we need to ask: what kinds of institutional features are more likely to have affinities with the technological characteristics of internet communication? A comparative approach allows us to hypothesize what may, or may not, gain traction in different political systems.

We hypothesize that different types of party organization and electoral environment have the potential to catalyze or to retard the development of internet campaigning. This is so because these institutions make new communication technologies more or less useful to candidates and parties.

When looked at comparatively, American parties and campaigns are unusual political institutions - quite different from those found in most European liberal democracies.

Consider two aspects of this:

The US is a much more pluralistic political system than the UK. It is federal, it has a strong separation of powers, and parties are comparatively weak and they are not nationally integrated. The UK is, despite devolution, a unitary system, has a very weak separation of powers, and parties and comparatively strong, integrated and hierarchical.

The pluralistic environment in the United States makes it necessary to build campaign networks composed of horizontal and vertical connections that mesh with the fundamentally fluid basis of the system.

Compare this with the UK, where the lines of communication are more vertically oriented, more firmly drawn and are based in long established formal structures with accompanying bureaucracies. The internet's suitability for creating loose horizontal networks has fewer affinities with this set of arrangements.

Second, the mechanisms for candidate recruitment and selection are also radically different in the two countries.

In the US, primaries and caucuses offer an institutional framework for sanctioned dissent. In the UK, the environment for candidate selection is much less open and fluid, and more nationally-oriented.

The long timescale and the uncertainty of the primaries encourages ‘outsiders’ and forces all candidates to continually build coalitions of support.

When the context is fluid, the risks are high, but the costs of organizational innovation are low, candidates are more likely to experiment online

In the UK, there are (literally) no, or very, very few, ‘outsider’ candidates, the selection process is internal to parties, to a fixed timetable and it’s nationally-uniform.

So in the UK, there is less need to use the internet for lowering costs and reducing uncertainty and risk by spreading a campaign across a wide range of networks.

There are other important differences between the two systems, such as the broader media environment and the rules governing campaign finance. If you want more detail on this argument, do feel free to download the paper at our website at Royal Holloway.

By way of a conclusion, I’d like to remind you that the subtitle of my talk was Why Things Will (Almost) Always Be Different in the UK.

Things may be changing as we speak, mainly because the eroding permanent membership base of British parties may actually be incentivizing them to seek alternative models to mobilize support. Watch this space!

Shock: social networking sites are not like real life

Funny video clip from the BBC satirising the process of "friending" in Facebook. Certainly brings home the chasm between face-to-face and online. But when I see comparisons like this I often think they're missing the point a bit. Online environments create new and hybrid contexts for interaction; that's part of what makes them shapers of social change.