February 24, 2016. O'Loughlin on narratives as a route to global order @SOAS

Ben O'Loughlin presented some of his latest research with Alister Miskimmon on strategic narratives at the Centre for Media Studies research seminar at SOAS on February 24, 2016. Please find the title and details of the talk below. 

Strategic Narratives and Power Transition: Communicating our Way to a Peaceful Order?

Historically, the transition of power from one hegemon to another has involved an all-out war in the international system. Britain acquired primacy, challenged then by Germany, who in turn was overcome by the US, and now there is a surge in speculation about a post-US order; power transition theory, that underpins conventionalist realist IR and therefore Western foreign policy, suggests that when the challenger reaches parity in material power, a war to define the rules of the international system takes place before a new order is institutionalized (Organski, 1958; Gilpin, 1981). But the rise of China, the rise of ‘the rest’, and the emergence of digital and network power all suggest we are entering a new kind of power transition. While the economic (GDP) power of China and the EU surpass the US, neither is challenging the US in a systemic war or seeking to assume hegemony. Instead, international order is increasingly based on competition for recognition in the context of plural narratives. This places communication central to how international order is constituted. Every country and city has a soft power and branding strategy. Price writes of a ‘marketplace for loyalties’. Each country that seeks recognition as a major power has an international broadcaster. In short, public and cultural diplomacy have become integral to the negotiation of identity and recognition in this new kind of power transition. The stakes again are high. Previous power transitions resulted in total war. Can the strategic narratives of the major players align today? Will a communication-based competition cultivate the conditions for a conflict-free power transition?

Iconoclash - new article on images and Islamic State

As part of its Iconoclash season of debate, the European Union's National Institute for Cultures has published a commentary by Ben O'Loughlin about Islamic State's use of visual media. 

Iconoclash: It's the Clash, Stupid

From 9/11 to the most treasured temple in Palmyra, Islamist destruction reminds us that we have objects and values we hold as untouchable and inviolable. It also makes us question whether we have a strategy to save them. This iconoclash has cycled through the angry pointing cleric clip, the beheading video, the burning man in a cage gif, the vandalism montage, the full-on terrorist attack. It is a clash through the exchange of icons and images, and each ‘side’ in the war on terror has shown trophies of valuable dead people, objects, targets destroyed or being destroyed, a tit-for-tat of shock and awe. We will match your orange Guantanamo jumpsuit with our orange hostage jumpsuit. Yet if we are to properly respond to this iconoclasm, we must understand why it is happening. It is happening in part because of Islamists’ drive to restore pride and dignity and avenge historical humiliation by creating a game of equals. However, this iconoclash is ultimately driven by geopolitical strategy. For Islamic State, the clash is about winning that game on Islamic State’s terms.

Read on here

New symposium on Strategic Narratives published

Strategic narratives are an ever-more visible phenomenon in international affairs. NATO has a strategic narrative to overcome Russia. President Obama had a narrative about US interests and attention pivoting to Asia but has recently taken steps to 'reassure' Europe that it still cares about it and is part of its story. What difference do these narratives make, and how can we explain how they work?

A new symposium has been published in Critical Studies of Security in which scholars of varying perspectives and approaches present short essays that engage with the book Strategic Narratives published by Miskimmon, O'Loughlin and Roselle. The symposium concludes with a response from the three authors. The symposium shows how narratives are a feature of political life from the grand strategy of great powers down to local politics where people try to make a difference by getting others to see problems in a new way. The debate also makes clear how difficult it is to establish the intention of actors who communicate narratives and the effect of narratives. Persuasion is not easy and power through communication is a murky process.

We hope you enjoy reading it. Thanks go to Laura Shepherd at the University of New South Wales for organising the symposium.

New article on think tanks and influence by Anna Longhini

Chatham House in London was one of the think tanks in Anna's study.

Chatham House in London was one of the think tanks in Anna's study.

Do think tanks influence government? In a new article (read for free here), Anna Longhini presents research suggesting that we should turn that question around. Comparing the role of foreign policy think tanks in the UK and Italy, Anna finds that the think tanks orient their activities to make the best of the opportunities for influence they face. In the UK, government is relatively open to think tank ideas, holding various open and closed-door briefings to elicit their suggestions. In Italy government is less willing to listen, so think tanks try instead to influence journalists, academics and companies. 

Anna was a visiting researcher at the New Political Communication Unit in 2014. She recently completed her PhD at Scuola Normale Superiore (Firenzi).

Awan speaks in Melbourne and Beijing on Youth Radicalism, Social Media, and Political Disillusionment.

Akil Awan spoke this week at the ‘Democracy in Transition’ conference organised by the University of Melbourne’s School of Government on Understanding Youth Democratic ‘Disconnect’: From Apathy to Political Radicalism and Extremism. His paper focused on explaining that whilst youth political engagement was an integral and essential part of a healthy functioning society, which was not only vital to political socialization and participation, but also crucial to engendering young people’s understanding of their own roles as democratic citizens, it was nevertheless under serious threat. The alternative - the democratic disconnect - could simply result in political apathy and disengagement, which remained a significant problem worldwide, evident from chronically low voter turnouts amongst youth demographics. However, equally problematically, he argued youth can also choose to engage in political radicalism or extremism, ranging from simply espousing extreme views; to actively joining radical groups; and finally to engaging in illegitimate political activity, such as violent protest and even terrorism. His paper sought to address how might we account for this increasingly problematic democratic disconnect amongst young people?

Taking both historical and contemporary case studies, he sought to show how increasing political disenfranchisement and disillusionment with traditional political processes, institutions and structures, was central to understanding young people’s alienation from conventional politics. Perceptions that the issues which concerned them were not being addressed, often resulted in a recourse to protest and demonstrations. Where ‘legitimate’ forms of protest proved unsuccessful, individuals might begin to countenance illegitimate and violent forms of protest, including rioting, public disorder, sabotage, and even terrorism. Consequently, a gravitation towards radicalism could be understood as one of the ways in which young people might seek to air their frustrations and grievances, as well reclaiming political agency.

Awan will also address a related topic in Beijing on Monday 14th December at the School of Journalism and Communication at the University of Renmin. His talk entitled ‘From Television in the Vietnam War to Islamic State’s Social Media: Exploring the Relationship between Media Technologies & Youth Radicalism’ will address the historical correlation between the rise of certain media technologies and the emergence of youth protest and political radicalism. He will compare the emergence of television during the Vietnam war and the attendant rise of countercultural and protest movements on the radical left, with the use of web 2.0 technologies by political radicals today. The paper will also seek to explain why social media and web 2.0 platforms have emerged as the principle arena for youth political and social engagement over the last decade. Whilst the democratic and egalitarian nature of these platforms means they are largely positive additions, conducive to the ‘levelling’ of hierarchies of knowledge and power, they have inevitably also contributed significantly to the rise and visibility of youth radicalism and extremism. His paper offers suggestions on how governments might deal with these issues.

Reflecting on The Paris Attacks: Lessons on counter-terrorism and anti-immigrant rhetoric from the age of the 19th C Anarchists

Akil Awan writes for The National Interest on the Paris terrorist attacks, comparing them to the Anarchist wave of terrorism that plagued Europe and the US, over 120 years ago. He uncovers the uncanny parallels between the two, reflecting on the increasingly polarised political discourse in both eras that resulted in knee-jerk, draconian security and state responses, as well as rampant anti-immigrant rhetoric and legislation. He encourages policymakers to reflect on history and warns against repeating the mistakes made in delaing with the anarchist scourge.

The National Interest, November 21, 2015
Akil N Awan

The bearded young terrorist furtively slipped amongst the oblivious theatergoers. Glancing around to ensure he had not aroused suspicion, he looked out over the crowded throngs in the theater. Blissfully unaware of the carnage that awaited them, they laughed and reveled in their petty entertainments, he mused, while his own people suffered and died. They would all pay, he consoled himself, as he hurled the bombs into their midst. The unspeakable horror that ensued, of shattered lives and limbs, was quickly emblazoned on the front page of French newspapers. Elsewhere, a second terrorist walked into a small trendy café in Paris. Scanning the oblivious faces—ordinary French men and women—as they sat drinking and listening to music, he placed his bomb under a table. As he slipped away, he heard the bomb explode, followed by a deafening silence, only to be punctuated by the terrible wails and screams of the survivors. There are no innocents, and they all deserve to die, he rehearsed in his mind, drowning out the cries of the victims behind him.

These events did not occur in Paris last week. Eerily, they took place over 120 years ago in European capitals as the scourge of anarchist terrorism was sweeping the continent. Santiago Salvador had attacked the Liceu Opera House in Barcelona in 1893, during a packed performance of the operaWilliam Tell, killing twenty-two people and injuring thirty-five. A few months later, Emile Henry had set off a bomb in the Café Terminus in Paris, killing one and wounding twenty, but had hoped for a far higher death toll. Images capturing the shocking events made the covers of the world’s largest daily newspapers of the time, Le Petit Journal and Le Petit Parisien. Both had a combined daily circulation of around seven million copies, depressingly illustrating how terrorism has long wielded the power to transform local tragedies to European catastrophes. In their subsequent trials, the anarchist terrorists showed no remorse for their terrible crimes, refusing to accept that ordinary bourgeois theatergoers or coffee drinkers could be considered innocent. Instead, they went to the guillotine, defiantly reeling off a litany of the crimes committed by the state and wider society.

These angry young radicals used bombs and guns to terrorize their own societies in furtherance of a foreign creed, in much the same way that jihadists recently did in Paris. The similarities are truly uncanny. If there is one salient difference, it is that the anarchists were actually far more successful in their campaign than the jihadists today. In a short period of time, they managed to assassinate an impressive list of world leaders, including two U.S. presidents, the Russian tsar, the German Kaiser, the French and Italian presidents, the Italian king, the Austria-Hungarian empress and two prime ministers of Spain, as well as a whole host of the European ruling classes. They also targeted the bourgeois masses indiscriminately, increasingly failing to distinguish between the state and wider society, attacking targets as disparate as the Paris Stock Exchange, religious processions in Barcelona, the London Underground and the Greenwich Observatory. The London Times newspaper wrote at the time of an “anarchist epidemic.”

The response to anarchist terror was unnervingly similar to our own experience too. The state clamped down in typically repressive fashion, instituting a range of iniquitous laws and meting out extrajudicial, and often collective, punishment to large swathes of society. The assassination of U.S. President William McKinley in 1901, for example, by an anarchist who also happened to be a second-generation Polish immigrant, led to the expedited introduction of anti-immigration legislation which required the exclusion and deportation of anyone suspected of anarchist sympathies. Anti-anarchist propaganda images from the period are disquietingly reminiscent of the increasingly hardened attitudes we are already witnessing towards Syrian refugees. One typical U.S. political cartoon shows a swarthy, bearded, foreign anarchist, armed with a knife and bomb, creeping up behind the statue of Liberty, who holds her beacon aloft and calls out naively, “come unto me, ye opprest!”

In the European mainland, wide-scale surveillance of meetings and publications was followed by arrests and torture, and used to draw forced confessions. Indeed, various Western governments used the ominous threat of anarchist terror to then subdue any form of dissent against the state.

All of this had little tangible effect on the anarchists themselves. In fact, the anarchists executed by the state were often transformed into martyrs. The apathetic masses, who up until this point had remained largely indifferent to the anarchists’ propaganda, were increasingly polarized by the state’s draconian response. Indeed, the harder the state clamped down, the more powerful the movement became. The fear and insecurity engendered within this environment also granted tremendous powers to the state, which it could then use and abuse, to the detriment of society at large.

Why should this concern us? Most people have probably never heard of the anarchist reign of terror at all. However, that in itself is an important observation to make. Despite the spectacular violent successes of anarchist terrorism at the time—far more so than those of the jihadists today—anarchism achieved very little in the sociopolitical sphere in the long run. Within four decades, the violent ideology had consumed itself and in the process alienated any potential support base, quickly being replaced by more popular movements. The anarchists were soon forgotten and ultimately consigned to the wastebin of history. However, the anarchists do offer us two crucial lessons for dealing with the jihadist threat today.

Continue reading here

October 30: Amy P. Smith to present her research on ITV's election 2015 coverage at Reuters Institute Conference on Negotiating Culture

On October 30, Newpolcom doctoral researcher Amy P. Smith will present material from her ongoing research on political communication during the 2015 UK general election to Oxford's Reuters Institute's conference on Negotiating Culture: Integrating Legacy and Digital Cultures in News Media.

Amy's paper is titled 'Campaign culture 2015: embracing intermediality to “tell the story” in ITV news’ election 2015.'

The full lineup is over at conference organizer Rasmus Kleis Nielsen's blog.